Maryland Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 4

Article 4

Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and
Regulation in an Internet Age
Kate Klonick

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Internet Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
Recommended Citation
75 Md. L. Rev. 1029 (2016)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

RE-SHAMING THE DEBATE: SOCIAL NORMS, SHAME,
AND REGULATION IN AN INTERNET AGE
KATE KLONICK *
Advances in technological communication have dramatically
changed the ways in which social norm enforcement is used to
constrain behavior.
Nowhere is this more powerfully
demonstrated than through current events around online shaming
and cyber harassment. Low cost, anonymous, instant, and
ubiquitous access to the Internet has removed most—if not all—of
the natural checks on shaming. The result is norm enforcement
that is indeterminate, uncalibrated, and often tips into behavior
punishable in its own right—thus generating a debate over
whether the state should intervene to curb online shaming and
cyber harassment.
A few years before this change in technology, a group of legal
scholars debated just the opposite, discussing the value of
harnessing the power of social norm enforcement through
shaming by using state shaming sanctions as a more efficient
means of criminal punishment. Though the idea was discarded,
many of their concerns were prescient and can inform today’s
inverted new inquiry: whether the state should create limits on
shaming and cyber bullying. Perhaps more importantly, the
debate reintroduces the notion of thinking of shaming within the
framework of social norm enforcement, thus clarifying the
taxonomy of online shaming, cyber bullying, and cyber
harassment.
This Article ties together the current conversation around
online shaming, cyber bullying, and cyber harassment with the
larger legal discussion on social norms and shaming sanctions.
It argues that the introduction of the Internet has altered the
social conditions in which people speak and thus changed the
way we perceive and enforce social norms. Accordingly, online
shaming is (1) an over-determined punishment with indeterminate
social meaning; (2) not a calibrated or measured form of
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punishment; and (3) of little or questionable accuracy in who and
what it punishes.
In reframing this problem, this Article looks at the viability of
the legal, normative, private, and state solutions to controlling
online shaming. It argues that looking only to state regulation
will be an inefficient and ineffective solution. Instead, it proposes
using the realizations from the shame debate, successful uses of
online norm enforcement, and private remedies to inform the
debate around state intervention.
INTRODUCTION
At Pycon, a tech developers’ conference in California, two men—Bob
Smith and Fred Jones 1—sat in the audience at a presentation about
“dongles,” devices that attach externally to computers and mobile devices.
With a giggle, Smith turned to Jones and muttered a half-thought-out joke
about “big dongles” and “forking someone’s repo.” 2 “It was so bad, I don’t
remember the exact words,” he later said. “[Something] about a fictitious
piece of hardware that has a really big dongle––a ridiculous dongle. . . . It
wasn’t even conversation-level volume.” 3 The “joke” was overheard by a
woman in the row in front of them, who stood up, turned around, and took
their photograph. She then tweeted the picture to her 9,209 followers with
the subtitle, “Not cool. Jokes about forking repo’s in a sexual way and
‘big’ dongles. Right behind me #pycon.” 4
The woman who took the photo, a thirty-something black Jewish
developer named Adria Richards, followed the Tweet up the next day with
a blog-post discussing the photo and the importance of accountability for
“antinormative” behavior.5 In part because of the public outrage generated
by Richards’s posts, Smith was fired. 6
Following his firing, Smith issued a public explanation and apology on
another message board news site. 7 In response, Smith started receiving
1. Bob Smith and Fred Jones are pseudonyms; both men’s real identities remain
anonymous.
2. Forking in tech talk means to copy another person’s software so you can work on it
independently, change, and ideally improve on it. The phrase “forking someone’s repo” is both a
type of semi-flattery (in that imitation is flattery) and sexual euphemism (that is, exploiting
another’s work entirely for your own benefit, with no benefit to them).
3. JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED 112 (2015).
4. Adria Richards (@adriarichards), TWITTER (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:32 PM),
https://twitter.com/adriarichards/status/313417655879102464/photo/1.
5. Adria Richards, Forking and Dongle Jokes Don’t Belong at Tech Conferences, BUT
YOU’RE A GIRL (Mar. 18, 2013, 9:36 PM), http://butyoureagirl.com/2013/03/18/adria-richards-ondongle-jokes-and-pycon-2013/.
6. RONSON, supra note 3, at 116.
7. mr-hank, HACKER NEWS (Mar. 2013), https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5398681.
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notes and gestures of support from various people who had been watching
the events unfold online. Richards, however, had started to receive the
opposite: “A father of three is out of a job because a silly joke he was
telling a friend was overheard by someone with more power than sense.
Let’s crucify this cunt.” 8
Though Richards had initially enjoyed the positive attention from
feminist and activists online for her post, she was now faced with a
horrendous backlash. Anonymous users sent violent pictures and threats of
rape, kidnap, torture, and death via email and posted them on Internet
message boards and comments. 9 Richards’s employer was targeted by a
distributed denial of service (“DdoS”) attack, which crippled their website
and servers. A group of anonymous attackers communicated the ransom:
fire Richards, or the attacks will continue. She was fired the next day; over
a year later, she still does not have a job.10
Richards’s and Smith’s stories demonstrate how low cost, anonymous,
instant, and easy access to the Internet has eviscerated whatever “natural”
limits there were to public shaming and has served to amplify its effects.11
Now, any perceived violation of a social norm—a racist tweet, 12 a sexist
joke, taking up too much room on public transportation13—can result in
immediate, prolific condemnation from millions of people all over the
world. Today, it is easier than ever to use shaming to enforce so-called
social norms, and it is easier than ever for shaming to spin out of control.
But these effects were not always so obvious. Two decades before
Smith and Richards were each shamed out of their employment, a number
of legal scholars debated the possible merits of using governmentsponsored shaming sanctions as an alternative to imprisonment for nonviolent low-level offenses. The debate, which grew out of a general interest
at that time in using social norms to regulate, began with a paper by
Professor Dan Kahan, which proposed shaming as an expressive and
functional replacement to imprisonment, but at far less cost.14
Taking place in the mid-1990s during a time largely innocent of the
Internet, the debate that followed was in many ways prescient of the
problems that would occur with online shaming. Professors James
Whitman and Eric Posner argued that shaming would create an

8. RONSON, supra note 3, at 120.
9. Id. at 120.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of
Law: The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998); see infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part IV (describing “manspreading”).
14. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).
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uncontrollable spiral into mob justice.15 Professor Martha Nussbaum
argued that shaming sanctions were contrary to human dignity, and instead,
acts should be shamed, not people. 16 Finally, Kahan, a decade after his
initial article, recanted his previous position, claiming shaming was not as
over-determined as prison and therefore less attractive to society. 17
A more thorough explanation of modern shaming, cyber bullying,
cyber harassment, and social norms and a detailed analysis of the work
from these scholars is included in Part I of this Article.
In the ten years since the debate ended, public shaming as a means of
enforcing social norms—totally separate from government-endorsed
shaming sanctions—has continued, but changed dramatically. Through a
series of examples, Part II descriptively demonstrates how the rise of
inexpensive, anonymous, instant, and easily accessible communication
technology has removed natural limits on shaming. The result is norm
enforcement that is indeterminate, uncalibrated, and often tips into behavior
punishable in its own right.
Part III examines how the Internet and modern technology have altered
the social conditions in which we speak and, in turn, changed how we
enforce social norms. Viewed within this framework of social norm
enforcement, the modern examples of online shaming and harassment in
Part II demonstrate that online shaming: (1) is an over-determined
punishment with indeterminate social meaning; (2) is not a calibrated or
measured form of punishment; and (3) is of little or questionable accuracy
as to who and what it punishes.
With the debate thus reframed, Part IV will look at the viability of
various proposed legal, normative, private, and state methods of controlling
public shaming. The question of the prudence of these limits—or their
feasibility and necessity—brings us to a new modern iteration in the debate
over norms, norm enforcement, and state action in an Internet era. This
Article argues that looking only to state regulation will be an inefficient and
ineffective solution to unfettered norm enforcement. Instead, it proposes
using the realizations from the shame debate, successful uses of online
norm enforcement, and private remedies to inform the debate around state
intervention.

15. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 93, 109 (2000); James Q. Whitman, What is
Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–68 (1998).
16. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME,
AND THE LAW 230–33 (2004); see also Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully
Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 2157, 2179 (2001).
17. Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075
(2006).
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I. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NORMS, SOCIAL MEANING, AND SHAMING
A. Modern Shaming, Modern Harassment
For such a recognizable emotion, defining shame is a surprisingly
difficult task. 18 Though there are disagreements on whether shame is
related to disgust or embarrassment; a stigma or a result of a stigma; or the
outcome of insult to human dignity, it can be generally agreed on as an
unpleasant feeling that results from awareness that one has engaged in
wrong or socially transgressive behavior. 19 Shame is different than guilt or
embarrassment, which can be considered internal and self-enforced feelings
following bad behavior; shame is external and enforced socially. 20
Stories of people using shame to punish unfavorable behavior fill
myths, stories, and art the world over. In Greek myth, Myrrha was shamed
and turned into a tree when she tricked her father into an incestuous
union. 21 In the Danish fairytale, “The Red Shoes,” a vain girl who insists
on wearing ostentatious red shoes to church is then forced to wear them
forever and dance continuously to her death. 22 And of course, Nathaniel
Hawthorne forever linked a scarlet “A” to adulterous women in America. 23
Such stories are not confined to fiction or to history. In Kabul, a man
accused of illicit sex was paraded through the streets. 24 In China,
prostitutes and other criminals are forced to parade publicly, and it is now
common practice to require criminals to confess and atone on television
before their trials. 25 And in America, publishing the names of prostitutes’

18. For example, see generally the lengthy discussion of shame in NUSSBAUM, supra note
16; ANDREW P. MORRISON, THE CULTURE OF SHAME (1986); FRANCIS BROUCEK, SHAME AND
SELF (1991), and of course the work of the participants in the debate discussed infra Part I.C.
19. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of shame lists it first as “a painful feeling of
humiliation or distress caused by the consciousness of wrong or foolish behavior.” Shame,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011).
20. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 677–79 (1986) (discussing the role of norms and their
enforcement via shame, in extralegal dispute resolutions).
21. OVID, METAMORPHOSES BOOK X, 298–502 (Anthony S. Kline, trans., 2000) (c.8 C.E).
22. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Red Shoes in HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN’S
COMPLETE FAIRY TALES (Wordsworth Editions 1998) (1845).
23. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Classic Books International 2009)
(1850).
24. See Whitman, supra note 15, at n.6 (citing Terence White, Man Accused of Illicit Sex
Paraded through Kabul Streets, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 14, 1996).
25. Andrew Jacobs, China Seeks to End Public Shaming, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/world/asia/28china.html?_r=0; Anne Namam, Taking It to
the Screens, Beijing TV Confronts the City’s Street Criminals, ASIA WEEK (July 19, 1996),
http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/96/0719/feat2.html; Megha Rajagopalan, TV
Confessions in China an Unsettling New Trend for Executives, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-confessions-idUSBRE9800HJ20130901.
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johns, or ordering those convicted of drunk driving to put bumper stickers
on their cars declaring their crime, have continually made scattered
appearances as court-ordered punishment. 26
One might wonder where shaming stops and bullying or harassment
begins. Bullying is generally understood among academics and educators
as having to meet three criteria: (1) it must be verbal or physical aggression;
(2) it must be repeated over time; and (3) it must involve a power
differential. 27 When talking about cyber bullying, the aggression is mostly
verbal; using “threats, blackmail . . . gossip and rumors” and online
personas or messages can be more cruel, vindictive, and mean. 28 Cyber
bullying also typically describes acts between children, but the same acts by
adults could be considered cyber harassment.
At least in part, cyber harassment “involves threats of violence,
privacy invasions, reputation-harming lies, calls for strangers to physically
harm victims, and technological attacks.” 29 Though all of these things
would also fall under a simple legal definition of harassment or abuse, the
“cyber” distinction adds a critical element: the way in which “the Internet
exacerbates the injuries suffered. . . . by extend[ing] the life of destructive
posts.” 30
So what makes online shaming 31 different from cyber bullying or
cyber harassment? Just like cyber bullying or harassment, it often involves
repeated verbal aggression over time, but it has another key element:
shaming also involves the attempt to enforce either a real, or perceived,
violation of a social norm. Online shaming often turns into cyber bullying
and harassment the more attenuated the social actions become from the
nexus of social norm enforcement. Thus, an essay deriding a young girl for
smiling in a selfie at Auschwitz might be considered shaming; anonymous
emails sent three weeks later calling for the girl to die, be raped, or kill
herself would be better considered cyber harassment.
The definition of shaming hinges on social norms, but what is meant
by social norms exactly? The following Part briefly examines their use in

26. For a more thorough list of these types of crimes see Whitman, supra note 15, at 1061
and Kahan, supra note 14, at 631–32.
27. EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF BULLYING AND
REDISCOVERING THE POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY 28 (2013) (citing DAN OLWEUS,
BULLYING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE CAN DO 142–52 (1993)).
28. BAZELON, supra note 27, at 33–34 (citing Patricia A. Snell & Elizabeth K. Englander,
Cyberbullying Victimization and Behaviors Among Girls: Applying Research Findings in the
Field, 6 J. SOC. SCI. 510–14 (2010).
29. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 3 (2014).
30. Id. at 4.
31. I will use the term “online shaming” to refer to what is often called “public shaming” by
the popular press.
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the law, and then how it was once imagined that shaming could be used as a
tool by the state.
B. Social Norms and Social Meaning
Though norms had long been studied by sociologists, anthropologists,
and economists, their identification and utility in the law is credited as
being first realized by Professor Robert Ellickson in a 1986 article about
cattle rangers in Shasta County, California,32 and expounded in a book he
published in 1991. 33 By the mid-1990s, the idea had been taken up by lawand-economics scholars hypothesizing on the creation and use of social
norms in modern regulation. 34
Though perhaps differing at the margins, there appears at least to be
consensus around the definition and function of a social norm among these
scholars. 35 A social norm is a rule without an official source (like the
government) enforced without the threat of any kind of official sanction
An individual’s
(legal action), yet complied with, nonetheless.36
compliance with the norm can be enforced externally by third parties, or
internally by one’s self. 37 Norms can be internalized and self-enforced, so
that no third-party action is needed for them to be perpetuated. 38 Selfenforcement might be individual feelings of guilt or embarrassment for
norm violation; or it could be feelings of elation or joy for norm
compliance. 39 As already discussed, external enforcement for norm
violation might be shaming or ostracizing the violator from the group; or it
could be honoring an individual for compliance with the norm.
Norms and the law interact in three distinct ways to inform individual
behavior:
(1) Non-legal norms. These are the unwritten codes that maintain
civility and order in various pockets of society: the courtesy of giving your
seat to an elderly person on the subway, flushing a public toilet after use, or
walking up or down on the right side of stairs. There is no legal or
32. See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 672–73.
33. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
34. Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3 (2001).
35. Id.
36. Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 365, 365 (1997). Put in another, more active way, social norms are rules “governing an
individual’s behavior that third parties other than state agents diffusely enforce by means of social
sanctions.” Ellickson, supra note 34, at 3.
37. Posner, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. Ellickson, supra note 34, at 3; see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 345–50 (1997) (on esteem-based norms).
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government punishment for violating these norms, only an individual’s
internal enforcement, or enforcement on a violating individual by a third
party.
(2) Norm-informing law. These are the codes of conduct or behavior
that are enforceable both through the law and through external or internal
enforcement: theft, drunk driving, and paying your taxes, are some
examples. Violating these laws (and consequently the norms that underlie
them) results in legal punishment, which can be a proxy enforcer for the
norms, or a complement enforcer to internal or third-party enforcement.
(3) Law-informing norms. Laws can also nudge norms in new
directions. This is seen with the rise in norms against racism, smoking, and
judging stay-at-home dads. 40
At the same time that scholars began to discuss norms, they also began
developing and discussing the concurrent idea of social meaning. 41 A
social norm is a standard that society generates to govern the behavior of its
members. 42 Social meaning is the converse: an act’s social meaning is
determined by its relationship with society’s norms. 43 Social meanings and
social norms thus depend on each other. Social norms function largely
because people understand the social meaning of actions that deviate or
comply with social norms. Society then punishes, or rewards, deviance or
compliance with its norms by identifying the social meaning of certain acts
and compelling individuals to comply with them. In this way, social norms
allow society to compel individuals to behave in certain ways by attaching
social meanings to various actions they take. 44
Norms, it was thus argued, could—or did—create order without law. 45
For legal economists, the “discovery” of norms and their role in legal
analysis was akin to finding a vast untapped resource. 46 In contrast to the
expense of passing cumbersome government regulation and putting
enforcement mechanisms in place, perhaps already-existing norms could be

40. See McAdams, supra note 39; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (discussing the role of law on changing norms around smoking,
gender roles, and race).
41. See McAdams, supra note 39.
42. Lessig, supra note 11, at 680–81.
43. Id.
44. Not everyone believes that the distinction between social norms and social meaning is a
worthwhile one. For a thoughtful critique, see RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS
OF LAW (2015), at 165–68.
45. Indeed, this was the title of the foundational book on the subject. See ELLICKSON, supra
note 33.
46. Ellickson called it a “boomlet” in interest around norms. Ellickson, supra note 34, at 3;
see also, McAdams, supra note 39, at 344–47.
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exploited as an independent and more efficient source of regulation.47
Perhaps—in the right context—the law could even free ride on norms.
C. Shaming Sanctions Debate
It was this idea of piggybacking on social norms to more efficiently
achieve the goals of regulation that began the debate around shaming
sanctions. The players in this debate, and their relevant scholarship, are
summarized in loose chronological fashion below.
1. Kahan 1.0
The goal of What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?—as expressed by
the author, Dan M. Kahan 48—was not simply to support shaming
punishments in place of prison, but rather to put forth social meaning49 as a
necessary element to successful use of alternative sanctions.50
To do this, Kahan (hereinafter Kahan 1.0) puzzled over America’s
dependence on the prison system as a form of punishment. If alternative
sanctions like fines and community service were accepted51 as doing as
good of a job deterring nonviolent offenders as prison, why were we still
locking up our cheating bankers and drunk drivers? What was it about
imprisonment that Americans liked so much that they were willing to pay
so much for it, even when better options were available? 52
Kahan 1.0 theorized the answer was that imprisonment played a more
powerful expressive role in punishment, and therefore, it offered something
extra that punishment like fines or community service did not.53 That
expressive role, he theorized, was society’s “condemnation”54 or “moral
disapprobation” 55 of the offender’s act. Thus, society is willing to accept a
higher price tag to punish certain crimes, even where community service or
fines would provide similar deterrence, for the expressive value it
provides. 56

47. See Kahan, supra note 14; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHI. L. REV 943 (1995).
48. See Kahan, supra note 17, at 2077–81 (discussing and analyzing his original work from
ten years prior).
49. Id.
50. See generally Kahan, supra note 14.
51. Id. at 605–30.
52. Id. at 592.
53. Id. at 635–37.
54. Id. at 606.
55. Kahan, supra note 17, at 2077.
56. Kahan, supra note 14, at 617–30.
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The solution to this inefficiency, Kahan 1.0 proposed, could be found
in shaming sanctions. Shaming could be a “perfect cocktail” of alternative
sanctions at a much lower cost than imprisonment, but with all the
expressive satisfaction. 57 The form that such shaming could take was split
roughly into four categories: (1) Public Stigmatizing (an ad in a newspaper
stating a domestic abuser beats women); (2) Literal Stigmatizing (a bumper
sticker stating the driver was convicted of a DWI); (3) Self-Abasement (a
ceremony or ritual publicly disgracing the offender); and (4) Contrition
(forcing the violator to apologize). 58 In such a way, judges or lawmakers
handing out shaming sanctions would be capitalizing on established social
norms and methods of denunciation. Thus, shaming sanctions, Kahan 1.0
argued, could be the solution to over-imprisonment that previous alternative
sanctions could never be.
2. Massaro
Writing in response to Kahan 1.0, Toni M. Massaro surveyed the
“current” 59 state of shame and shaming, looking to psychology, sociology,
and culture before discussing its implications on legal reforms. 60 Her
critique was twofold, challenging first Kahan 1.0’s assumption that shaming
sanctions would be as effective as imprisonment, and then his failure to take
into account the effect shaming punishments might have on culture and
government. 61
As to the former—the “Efficacy Concerns”—Massaro claimed that
shaming punishments entailed far-too-many unknown variables to be
reliable as a specific deterrent. The power of a stigmatic shaming penalty to
change an individual’s behavior would be highly dependent on the offender,
the community the offender was shamed in, and the underlying crime. 62 A
gang leader, for example, might feel little or nothing at being forced to wear
a sign labeling him as a drug trafficker in an already high-crime
neighborhood.
Massaro also cast doubt on the effectiveness of shaming penalties as
general deterrence. 63 In addition to the instability and unpredictability
reasons above, she theorized that the current structure of modern society—
“[w]e (collectively) are not Victorian England, the Colonies, or pre-World

57.
58.
59.
60.
(1997).
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 635–41; see also Kahan, supra note 17, at 2075.
Kahan, supra note 14, at 631–34.
“Current” being 1996.
Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 645–89
Id. at 692–704.
Id. at 692–93.
Id. at 693–94.
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War II Japan”—would make shaming ineffective.64 The lack of community
conditions like neighbor-to-neighbor contact would mean that a shaming
punishment might not actually have a shaming effect at all. 65
Massaro also pointed out that shaming sanctions did not take into
account “private responses to the public penalty.” 66 Prison, fines, and
community service all had set endpoints—but shaming could have infinite
impacts. This made shaming not only difficult to calibrate as a proportional
penalty to the crime, but also a possible impediment to an offender’s reintegration into society. 67
Finally, Massaro discussed the alternative long-term reactions to
shame: some offenders, once being shamed, might have violent secondary
effects. Feeling shamed by a community might create feelings of
ostracization and ultimately encourage the offender to continue to act
against the norms, or they might simply act violently out of anger. 68
Conversely, over time and frequency of use, shaming might simply become
ubiquitous and lose its power as a tool of enforcing norms. 69
As to the latter of Massaro’s two main critiques—the “Social and
Political Concerns”—she hypothesized more broadly to the long-term
effects of shaming penalties on society. Centrally, that official shaming
would “erode decency norms” by normalizing cruelty through state
action. 70 Shaming might make certain offenders subject to them—perhaps
drunk drivers, white-collar criminals, child molesters—less than human. 71
Shame’s close—or complementary—relationship with humiliation
disgraces human dignity. It is ultimately “the rejection of human beings as
human.” 72
3. Whitman
Weighing in on the debate, James Q. Whitman cataloged and then
analyzed what he found to be the most salient and relevant arguments
against shaming sanctions. He first discarded two of Massaro’s central
ideas: that shaming sanctions cannot be effective in a modern society; and
that shaming sanctions are bad because they are contrary to human
64. Id.
65. For a more detailed analysis of this problem with shaming—its ineffectiveness in modern
society—see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880 (1991).
66. See Massaro, supra note 60, at 694.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id at 694–95.
70. Id. at 699.
71. Id. at 700.
72. Id. (citing AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 1 (1996)).
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dignity. 73 Arguments that shaming sanctions will not work, he argued, are
already disproven by modern courts’ continual reliance on them because of
their very effectiveness.74 As to claims of shaming’s impact on human
dignity, Whitman decoupled “dignity” from a definition in a broad human
rights-based sense and traced it instead to a Victorian tradition of bodily
dignity, which he argued as the dignity impacted by shaming. 75 This
dignity, he stated, “is gone throughout society” and thus, an ineffective
claim against the use of shaming sanctions today. 76
Assuming these premises, Whitman broached what he described as the
two “political” augments against shaming: the “liberal” argument that the
state cannot inflict shaming sanctions even if they are effective, because
moral coercion should be privately enforced; and the “statist” argument that
the state can use shaming sanctions, but should not, because it could incite
mob riots and a loss of state control. 77
The liberal argument Whitman derived from classical liberalism—
Rousseau to Mill—found shame to be a highly effective tool, but one that
could only be wielded by the people. 78 In other words, it was not the scarlet
“A” itself that caused the shame, it was the public opinion about what that
scarlet “A” represented—a judgment that would be present with or without
the state-sponsored signage. 79 While recognizing the truth in this, Whitman
cast doubt on the theory’s modern applicability in an age with mass media
and politics: “It is difficult, in light of some hard experience, to believe that
the state cannot succeed in destroying reputations.”80 Finally, Whitman
argued that “statist” arguments—that public shaming sanctions might incite
mob rioting—address a dangerous reality to shaming sanctions, but that
government cannot shirk from action merely because of a fear of riots.81
Having taken on each argument against shaming sanctions, Whitman
made his most convincing assessment of their danger: that shaming
sanctions “involve a dangerous willingness, on the part of the government,
to delegate part of its enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled
general populace.” 82 The menace in “lynch justice,” he argued, is not only
its subjectivity to the mercurial whims of a mob, but its potential to subject
73. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1062–68.
74. Id. at 1068.
75. Id. at 1070–79.
76. Id. at 1079.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1085–86.
79. At the risk of cross-pollinating arguments, this assessment supports, without specifically
saying so, the idea of social meaning put forth by Kahan and Lessig.
80. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1088.
81. Id. at 1085.
82. Id. at 1088.
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the offender to unending punishment. 83 Whitman called this potential
infinite punishment by the mob, a violation of “transactional dignity”—a
dignity he claimed arises from our belief that one should be able to “pay off
a debt once and for all and be done with our creditor.” 84 Shame sanctions’
danger, then, was that they undermined an “ethic of restraint and sobriety”
as well as a sense of “measured punishment.” 85
4. Posner
In Law and Social Norms, Eric Posner took a historical look at
shaming penalties, and argued that they have often proven unreliable.86
Similar to those arguments made by Massaro, Posner discussed the
imprecision of being able to calculate the effect of shame on any one
individual’s reputation but added a secondary level of complication: the
imprecision of a third-party’s desire to punish certain crimes. 87 The primary
motive to shame, Posner argued, is not justice, but rather enhancing one’s
own reputation. 88 This leads people to join in shaming not just to deter
future norm violation, but also to bolster their own worth in the eyes of the
community—or, as is seen in the example of organized crime, to join the
group to avoid its ire being turned on you. 89
Additionally, Posner argued, shaming often has undesirable spillover
effects on innocents. Such is the case when the family of an offender is
also shamed, even when they had no role in the violation. 90 This high level
of variance, he claimed, does not mean that shaming punishments are
ineffective, but rather that “the ‘average’ shaming punishment is not likely
to produce the optimal level of deterrence at the margin.” 91
Posner also claimed that shaming punishments would create deviant
sub-communities. Using the example of prostitution, he suggests that those
offenders who value visiting prostitutes more than they do the potential cost
of shaming, will continue to engage in the behavior—and when caught, and
shamed, will either be forced to “turn to a life of crime” and/or form a subcommunity. 92 If the punishment for prostitution is not shaming, but

83. Id. at 1089.
84. Id. at 1090. It is worth noting, and as will become relevant in Part III infra, that this
argument is similar to the point made by Massaro, supra note 60, at 694.
85. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1091.
86. POSNER, supra note 15, at 93.
87. Id. at 92.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See cuckolding and adultery or Bernie Madoff.
91. POSNER, supra note 15, at 94.
92. Id. at 102.
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imprisonment, Posner posited, those members will be removed from the
dominant population without the risk of the creation of a sub-community. 93
Posner’s issues with shaming sanctions differ from other theorists in
fact, but not theory. The heart of Posner’s two claims—that shaming
sanctions are messy and create undesirable externalities—is quite similar to
that expressed by Massaro and Whitman, and the problem of the
government being unable to control “the level of ostracism that it
provokes.” 94
5. Nussbaum
In her 2004 book Hiding Humanity, Martha C. Nussbaum devoted a
chapter to the specific question of shaming citizens and dismantling the
argument for government shaming sanctions.95 To wit:
The fact that the state is complicit in the shaming makes a large
difference. People will continue to stigmatize other people, and
criminals are bound to be among those stigmatized. For the state
to participate in this humiliation, however, is profoundly
subversive of the ideas of equality and dignity on which liberal
society is based. 96
Five distilled arguments, many of which have already been surveyed
here, are cited to bolster her point. First, Massaro’s argument that shame
penalties diminish human dignity; then Whitman’s stance that shaming
penalties would lead to an anarchist mob justice; third, Posner’s position
that shame punishments are simply too unreliable to be a government
position; then again, the arguably “dignity”-based argument that shamebased deterrents would “break the spirit” of offenders; 97 and finally, that
shame-based penalties would ultimately just be one more form of everincreasing government control. 98
From this panoply, Nussbaum laid the most consequential weight with
the question of shaming sanctions’ impact on human dignity: that shaming
sanctions will inevitably inflict their greatest weight on “vulnerable
minorities,” a particularized example of a greater problem of shaming
penalties’ effects on individual dignity. 99 Nussbaum also argues that
shaming is too harsh to use in a civilized society because it targets the
93. Id. at 95.
94. Id.
95. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 222–79.
96. Id. at 232.
97. Id. at 236. Nussbaum relies here on Steven Schulhofer, but I believe this argument is just
another variant on the dignity argument professed by Massaro and already acknowledged by
Nussbaum.
98. Id. at 230–36.
99. Id. at 278–79.
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person (“you are bad”) instead of the person’s acts (“you did a bad thing”)
and thus “marks” a person “defective” in society with a degraded
identity. 100
6. Kahan 2.0
In 2006, ten years after his proposal for shaming as an alternative
sanction in place of imprisonment for low-level offenses, Kahan
recanted. 101 Setting aside the arguments of his detractors, he acknowledged
that shame was “an unacceptable alternative sanction” for much of
society—though for completely separate reasons than his critics had put
forth. 102 The true problem with shame sanctions, Kahan (hereinafter Kahan
2.0) argued, was that humans liked to shield or hide their desire for
expressive punishment, and while imprisonment accounts for this, shaming
punishments do not. 103 Imprisonment, in its blanket and multipurpose
punitive capacity, was “expressively over determined”—and thus many
different types of people, from all walks of life, could find whatever
meaning and affirmation of their values from that punishment. 104
Explained differently, when Person A is sent to prison for X offense,
the possible reasons for sending her to prison are multiple and their
application inexact: Person A might be in prison for rehabilitation, or
specific deterrence, or general deterrence, or retribution, or some
combination of all of the above. The punishment of prison does not have a
single determinate meaning—it is “over determined.”
But the same is not true of the punishment of shaming. While shaming
can be a punishment in search of future deterrence, the most blatant social
meaning of shaming is group retribution; or as Kahan 2.0 puts it: a highly
expressive and determined punishment. Thus, by providing this slightly
circular formulation, Kahan 2.0 gives the “real” reason shaming sanctions
will not work: people favor prison to shaming because prison gives people a
wider range of motives to hide behind than shaming gives.
In the context of modern-day online shaming, the shame sanctions
debate is more than a simple, somewhat ironic, historic hook—“Once we
talked about the government using shame, now we’re talking about the
government curbing shame!”—it is actually a valuable study of the role
shaming has had in our society and the role it plays in enforcing a
100. Id.
101. Kahan, supra note 17.
102. Id. at 2076.
103. Id. at 2085–86.
104. Id. at 2085 (citing Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the
Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55
EMORY L.J. 569, 586–606 (2006)).
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normative culture. By thinking of shaming within the framework of social
norm enforcement, the impact of the Internet can be better understood and
the taxonomy of online shaming, cyber bullying, and cyber harassment can
make more sense.
The next Part sets the stage for that discussion. Part II examines how
the low-cost, ubiquitous, anonymous, and instant nature of the Internet has
changed the natural limits on shaming and how it functions as social-norm
enforcement in modern society.
II. SHAMING AND THE INTERNET
The Internet is a normative place. That it would be such was
envisioned by the Father of Social Norms, Robert Ellickson, in a response
piece in the midst of the shame debate: “The fierce and (so far) largely
successful resistance to government regulation of those involved with the
Internet illustrates how members of a significant new social group have
opted to make norms, not law, their social-control instrument of choice.” 105
Ellickson’s observation was and continues to be correct: norms are the
primary social control mechanism of the Internet.106 The far greater
change, however, is that the Internet has altered the “social conditions in
which people speak” and thus changed the way we perceive and enforce
social norms. 107
Before the Internet, if a woman in Des Moines decided to steal all the
sugar packets at a restaurant and then empty the salt and pepper shakers into
a bag in her purse, she might be given a sideways glare by patrons and
brusque treatment from the waitress, and, at worst, asked to leave. Today, a
twelve-year-old can capture the freeriding café patron in a fifteen-second
video, upload it to Facebook, and tell the whole town, the whole city, the
whole country, the whole world: “GOT SALT AND PEPPER?! LOL MS.
SMITH IS HOARDER.” A banker in New York can watch the video on
105. Robert Ellickson, Social Norms, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 537, 551 (1998).
106. It is worth briefly noting that Massaro also touched on the role of the Internet in shaming,
but perhaps less presciently. First, that shaming would be ineffective in modern society because
“[i]n a mobile, anonymous, urban society, shaming may not be read by the public as any coherent,
collective community statement about its norms. In fact it may not be read at all by some
citizens.” Massaro, supra note 60, at 695. And second, that the lack of cultural conditions like
neighbor-to-neighbor contact seen in historically in Colonial or post-World II Japanese societies,
would no longer be present in modern times and thus render shaming ineffective. Id. While it
might be true that we have less neighbor-to-neighbor interaction in a borrow-a-cup-of-sugar-sense
that decline has certainly not led to interactive isolation. In fact, it would seem that the Internet
has in fact made the entire world neighbors (though anonymous ones) and also accentuated and
amplified both how and to what effect neighbor-to-neighbor shaming might take place.
107. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
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YouTube, type in a comment under his anonymous handle, and add: “crazy
bitch!” before forwarding it to twenty of his closest friends. The woman’s
identity and actions can circulate indefinitely around the Internet.
This example, and the next three true stories, demonstrate three things
about online shaming:
(1) Its social meaning is indeterminate. While the original shaming act
might have been about shame, the following actions have unclear social
meaning (Why did the banker type that? Was he reacting to her stealing? Or
just bored? Or just mean?). Shame could also have nothing to do with why
a person is called out.
(2) Its effects are uncalibrated. The low-cost, anonymous and endless
nature of the Internet means that Ms. Smith’s shame goes on forever, which
seems harsh punishment for the theft of a few sugar packets. 108
(3) Its accuracy is questionable. Viewers, including those in the
restaurant, have no way of really knowing what is happening. Maybe Ms.
Smith was given permission to take the salt, pepper, and sugar. Maybe she
is abjectly poor and needs it to survive. Or maybe she really is just a
hoarder. No process exists to determine truth, or between act and
punishment.
This Part contains three stories that each illustrate some or all of the
following qualities of online shaming or cyber harassment. 109 Though they
are admittedly anecdotal, they are by no means isolated, 110 and are valuable
for what they can illuminate about modern online norm enforcement and
the thin line between online shaming, harassment, and bullying.

108. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 662.
109. Paradoxically, popular press often refers to stories of this ilk as “public” shaming; in part
because such stories involves “the public” (i.e. third-party) condemnation of seemingly “private”
action between individuals. For the purposes of this Article I will adopt this language even though
it refers to what the scholars supra Part I label as “private” or non-government shaming. What
those scholars interchangeably call public, state, state sanctioned, or government shaming, I will
simply call “state shaming.”
110. See infra notes 111, 124, and 132.
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A. Gene Cooley 111
On September 11, 2008, Gene Cooley was at his job as a hairdresser
when he got a call from local police informing him that his fiancée, Paulette
Harper, had been murdered. Harper had been shot by her ex-husband—
against whom she had a restraining order for previous incidents of
violence—who had then turned the gun on himself. 112
Cooley and Harper lived in Blairsville, Georgia, a small town of 650
residents in the north part of the state. 113 Less than a week after Harper’s
death, a thread discussing the murder appeared on Topix, a local news and
message board site. 114 Participants on Topix message boards could post
and comment on news items instantly, anonymously, and without
moderation. Though starting off sympathetic, the comments on the thread
about Harper’s death had quickly turned derogatory, specifically in regard
to Cooley. 115
One user with the handle “Calvin” had insinuated that Cooley had
played a part in the murder and that Harper’s family was at risk. Another

111. Cooley’s story is not isolated. See also Ulrike Dauer & Lisa Fleisher, Former Formula
One Chief Max Mosley Settles Legal Dispute With Google, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-formula-one-chief-max-mosley-settles-legal-dispute-withgoogle-1431702038 (former President of Formula One Racing successfully sues News of the
World after paper published photos of him participating in group sex, which the paper falsely
characterized as a “Nazi Orgy”); Ki Mae Heussner & Susanna Kim, ‘Anonymous’ Posters to Pay
$13
Million
for
Defamatory
Comments, ABCNEWS.COM
(Apr. 24,
2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/jury-awards-13-million-texas-defamation-suitanonymous/story?id=16194071 (Texas couple successfully sues Topix.com users who published
over 25,000 posts accusing them of being sexual deviants, drug users, and child molesters); A.G.
Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves to the Web, and Turns Vicious, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2011, at A1 (describing various people who have been slandered by false postings on Anonymous
websites); Kashmir Hill, Blaming The Wrong Lanza: How Media Got It Wrong in Newtown,
FORBES.COM (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/12/17/blaming-thewrong-lanza-how-media-got-it-wrong-in-newtown/ (describing how in the immediate aftermath of
the Newtown Elementary school shootings law enforcement officials mistakenly transposed the
first name of Adam Lanza, the suspect and shooter, with his brother, Ryan, leading to Ryan
Lanza’s erroneous, immediate, and prolific vilification); Sarah Michael, ‘OK People, Take a Look
at This Creep!’: Man Who Mum Shamed on Facebook Because She Thought He Was Taking
Photos of Her Kids . . . Was Just Taking a Selfie in Front of a Darth Vader Display to Show HIS
Children, DAILY MAIL AUSTRALIA (May 8, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3073095/Mother-mistakenly-shames-dad-thought-taking-photos-kids-Facebook-post-sharedhundreds-actually-taking-selfie-Star-Wars-display-children.html#ixzz3hOVTgxnc (woman posts
picture of man on Facebook she mistakenly thinks is taking a picture of her children and suggests
he is a child molester, post is shared over 20,000 times, man is questioned by police).
112. Complaint, Cooley v. Ballew, on file with author. See also This American Life: Tarred
and Feathered, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/522/transcript.
113. This American Life, supra note 112, at 2.
114. Id. at 2–3.
115. Id. at 3.
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user “Mouth” added that Cooley could not be trusted around children and
that he was a pervert. In comments on the thread, Calvin replied to Mouth,
thanking Mouth for the warning. Someone else with the pseudonym
“Bugs” wrote that Cooley was a heavy drug user and had cheated on his
first wife extensively. 116
In the days and weeks that followed, the comments continued to add
up. Cooley was called a pervert, pagan, creep, child molester, adulterer,
liar, drunk, and wife-beater. Users on Topix even suggested he was
responsible for Harper’s murder, and then in the same breath, as if the ideas
were of equal value, would mention Cooley had been fired from every job
he had ever held. 117
It is crucial to note that none of these allegations were true. Cooley
had never used drugs, been accused of violence or excessive drinking, or
practiced paganism, and he did not have anything in his past to suggest
perversion. 118 But in the small town of Blairsville, such idle remarks had
immediate effect: Cooley was ignored by friends and acquaintances, at best,
and at worst, called obscenities and not allowed into certain places of
business. 119 At work, all his clients stopped having him cut their hair, and
the salon’s owner asked him, politely, to quit because his presence was
driving away business. 120 The effect went outside the small town of
Blairsville, too: Harper’s family in Florida had seen the posts, and stopped
speaking with Cooley; Cooley’s grown children cut off contact upon seeing
the posts.
Two and a half months after Harper’s death, Cooley had lost his
family, friends, and his job, and he was unable to get another. After sixteen
years in Blairsville, he left and moved to Augusta. He also hired an
attorney, who successfully managed to subpoena Topix for the identities of
the users who had defamed Cooley. Calvin, Bugs, Mouth, and a host of
others all turned out to be the same person: a 52-year-old woman named
Sybil Denise Ballew, who had briefly worked at the same local department
store as Cooley in 1999. 121 Cooley had no memory of Ballew, but Ballew
remembered him well and justified her disregard for him based on the “way
he looked at the younger girls in staff.” 122
Whatever her alleged justifications for libeling Cooley, in 2011 a jury
awarded him a $404,000 judgment for defamation of character and libel,
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 3–4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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$250,000 of which was punitive damages. Though Ballew has yet to pay
on this judgment (it appears she is judgment-proof), the verdict has allowed
Cooley to reclaim his life. He has repaired his relationships with friends
and family and moved back to Blairsville, where he claims people treat him
like nothing ever happened. 123
B. Justine Sacco 124
Justine Sacco, a corporate communications director at a large
American Internet media company, was boarding a plane in Heathrow on
her way to visit family in South Africa when she shot off a quick Tweet:
“Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” 125
Eleven hours later Sacco landed in Cape Town, and turned on her
phone to learn she was “the No. 1 worldwide trend on Twitter.” 126 Though
she had only 170 followers on her Twitter account when she had taken off,
she now had tens of thousands of replies and responses to her AIDS tweet.
The genesis of the outrage was an anonymous tipster to Sam Biddle, an
editor at Valleywag, a subsidiary of Gawker Media. Biddle had retweeted
Sacco’s offensive Tweet to 15,000 followers, and then written a brief post
about it on the site titled “And Now, a Funny Holiday Joke from IAC’s P.R.
Boss.” 127
In the mere hours it took Sacco to reach Cape Town, a literal mob had
amassed on Twitter to track her flight and shame her in person. Rallied
around the hashtag “#HasJustineLandedYet,” people around the world
123. Telephone Interview with Russell Stookey, Attorney for Gene Cooley (July 30, 2015).
124. Sacco’s story is not isolated. See also Cavan Sieczkowski, Lindsey Stone, Plymouth
Woman, Takes Photo at Arlington National Cemetery, Causes Facebook Fury, HUFF. POST (Nov.
27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/lindsey-stone-facebook-photo-arlingtonnational-cemetery-unpaid-leave_n_2166842.html (Lindsey Stone was shamed after taking picture
in which she mock screams and displays her middle finger at sign asking for silence and respect at
Arlington Cemetery); Jessica Durando, Auschwitz Selfie Girl Defends Actions, USA TODAY (July
23,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/07/23/selfie-auschwitzconcentration-camp-germany/13038281/ (Alabama teen shamed online for posting a selfie of
herself smiling at Auschwitz); Daniel Engber, Were We Too Hard on Jonah Lehrer?, SLATE, Mar.
31, 2015 (high-visibility plagiarism story of Jonah Lehrer); This American Life: Retraction,
CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/460/transcript (high-visibility plagiarism of Mike Daisey); Hilary Whiteman,
#WalterPalmer: From Hunter to Hunted—Internet Seeks Revenge for Cecil the Lion, CNN.COM
(July 29, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/29/world/cecil-lion-walter-palmer-social-reaction/
(global outrage on social media after Midwestern dentist travels to Africa and shoots beloved
“celebrity” lion).
125. Sam Biddle, And Now, a Funny Holiday Joke from IAC’s PR Boss, VALLEYWAG:
GAWKER (Dec. 20, 2013), http://valleywag.gawker.com/and-now-a-funny-holiday-joke-fromiacs-pr-boss-1487284969.
126. Jon Ronson, How One Stupid Tweet Blew up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Feb. 12, 2015.
127. Biddle, supra note 125.
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tracked Sacco’s flight, with one user going so far as to go to the Cape Town
International airport to photograph and live-tweet her arrival. 128 Other users
and the site BuzzFeed combed through her Tweets and compiled lists of
previous offenses in a post titled, “16 Tweets Justine Sacco Regrets.”129
Her employer fired her and Sacco cut her family vacation short due to
safety concerns (people were threatening to go on strike at hotels she was
staying at and her movements were being publicly tracked). She returned to
New York, jobless and isolated. Both applying for new employment and
rebuilding a social life proved incredibly difficult because “we Google
everyone.” 130
Eventually Sacco left New York, volunteering as a public relations
agent at an NGO in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia that worked to lower maternalmortality rates. Though her negative Internet profile had not diminished,
she eventually returned to New York to take a new public relations job—a
move that was noted and mocked online. Though she has received a public
apology from Biddle, Sacco acknowledged that she still felt personally
humiliated. 131
C. Jill Filipovic 132
A first year law student at New York University, Jill Filipovic was at
her parents’ house recovering from a wisdom teeth extraction over winter
break when she was alerted that she was the topic of hundreds of threads at
Auto Admit, an anonymous message board for law students. 133 Filipovic
went to the webpage to discover hundreds of comments discussing her rape
and murder. 134 A feminist writer who published her own blog, Filipovic
was used to receiving harassing comments on posts, or even the occasional
email, but the Auto Admit threads were different. “What freaked me out
about Auto Admit was it was people claiming to have seen me in person,”
128. Ronson, supra note 126.
(Dec.
20,
2013),
129. 16
Tweets
Justine
Sacco
Regrets,
BUZZFEED
http://www.buzzfeed.com/jenvesp/16-tweets-justine-sacco-regrets-hxg7.
130. Ronson, supra note 126.
131. Id.
132. Jill’s story is not isolated. See also Michelle Goldberg, Feminist Writers Are So Besieged
by Abuse That Some Have Begun to Retire, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/online-feminists-increasingly-ask-are-the-psychiccosts-too-much-to-bear/2015/02/19/3dc4ca6c-b7dd-11e4-a200-c008a01a6692_story.html; Sean T.
Collins, Anita Sarkeesian on GamerGate: ‘We have a Problem and We’re Going to Fix This’,
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/anita-sarkeesiangamergate-interview-20141017.
133. Jill Filipovic, Let’s Be Real: Online Harassment Isn’t Virtual for Women,
TALKINGPOINTSMEMO.COM CAFÉ (Jan. 10, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/let-s-bereal-online-harassment-isn-t-virtual-for-women.
134. Id.
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Filipovic recalls. “Through blogging I’ve meant crazy commenters and
harassers before, but these people were claiming that they were in my real
life—my off-line life.” 135 Also daunting was the fact that Filipovic’s
selection as a target for the hateful posts had no discernable link to anything
she had said or done: “Apparently, it had been going on for many months, I
have no idea how it began, even after I read all of the posts.” 136
Even though they existed “virtually” the Auto Admit posts had a
dramatic effect on Filipovic’s life, and most immediately on her time in law
school: she stopped speaking in class, wore hoodies to shield her face, and
made no friends. 137 Online, Filipovic would obsessively and painfully
monitor the threads, even though she understood it made the trauma
continually worse. 138 And she would try to stop it: when a picture of her in
a bikini was posted on one of the threads, she sent an email to Auto Admit
requesting its takedown. “They refused,” she recalled. “And then they
printed my email on the website.”139
Finally, Filipovic sought justice from her online supporters calling for
“personal-political collective action”: 140
Please feel free to copy any or all of what I’ve written here to
your own blog in order to help change the top-ranked search
engine results for Jill Filipovic. If you don’t have your own blog
then please at least link to one of Jill’s post[s] listed below at your
preferred social networking site and give it the tag ‘Filipovic.’141
The gambit worked, and by March 2007 top results for “Jill Filipovic” were
again about her bio or articles, and the reputational threads had fallen off
the page. 142
Still, to this day, Filipovic continues to get the occasional Google alert
that she is again a topic at Auto Admit. Moreover, the long-term effects of
the posting continue: “When I’d be at an event and people would glance at
my nametag, I used to have a brief flash of panic. That’s gone away, but
always being alert and on guard? That’s stayed.” 143

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Telephone Interview with Jill Filipovic (July 27, 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CITRON, supra note 29, at 70.
Id. 70–71.
Id. at 71.
Telephone Interview, supra note 135.
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III. RE-SHAMING THE DEBATE
To review: much of the appeal of shaming sanctions is that they would
allow the state to piggyback on how society enforced its own norms. In
practice, this would mean using the authority and voice of the state to put an
offender into the public consciousness to be shamed. Under normal
conditions, when a state punishes, it does three things:
(1) It gives an official social meaning to the punishment. The
punishment is for stealing; or rape; or money laundering, etc.
(2) It calibrates the punishment. It designates what it will entail and
how long it will last. Except in certain exceptions this is for a set period of
time and when completed an offender can begin again.
(3) It strives for accuracy. A process is in place to attempt to discern
whether the right person is being punished, whether the charges against
them are true, and whether circumstances should enhance or mitigate
punishment. While the process is far from perfect, it is present.
In the days before the Internet, Kahan and others imagined that
government-issued shame punishment could bring these elements to
normative punishments, and that normative punishments would also curbed
by natural limits: a trial or judge would determine the accuracy of your
crime. Your crime would be publicized. If a yard sign was placed in your
yard calling you a drunk driver, only a certain number of people in your
small community, if they walked by, would witness and take part in your
shame. The length of your punishment—apart from the actual public or
literal stigmatizing—was proscribed by the weaknesses of human memory
and the limited potential for mouth-to-mouth gossip. Shaming someone
also took actual effort, and also put the shamer at risk himself. Kahan 2.0
was not wrong when he categorized shaming as less over-determined than
prison: before the Internet, shaming was something quite specific.
But online shaming is different from the shaming imagined in the
shame debate because the Internet places cultural participation and
interaction in a new light. 144 Because of this, shame is a punishment meted
out separately from any kind of government oversight or coordination. This
means that the social meaning of shame can turn into harassment or
bullying; the accuracy of shaming can be non-existent or questionable; and
the Internet’s endless memory, ubiquity, and ease of access can make
punishment for a norm violation outsized and uncalibrated from the
underlying offense. As analyzed here, the examples in Part II supra
demonstrate that since the rise of the Internet, modern social-norm

144. Balkin, supra note 107, at 2.
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enforcement has dramatically changed and now lacks reliable social
meaning, calibration, and accuracy.
A. Indeterminate Social Meaning
Norms change. 145 They can change organically (taking a picture of
yourself in public might have been normatively “vain” ten years ago, but
“selfies” are now a fun, and commonplace practice); or they can change at
the urging of laws and regulation (legal desegregation made it difficult for
continued overt norms of racism to be accepted). But beyond the norms
themselves the Internet has changed how norms are enforced, and what
norm enforcement means. A top-down example will serve to illustrate the
mechanisms in play in online norm violations:
Here is an example of a norm:

And here is an example of an act:

And here is the social meaning
of that act in light of our norms:

And here is an example of an
act of norm enforcement:

And here is an example of one
social meaning of that third-party
act:

People should not say racist
things.
White girl makes public
statement that only black
people get AIDS.
White girl has violated norm
that disfavors racism.

Third-party writes blog post
on news media site about
white girl’s racist Tweet.
White girl has violated a
norm for Tweeting racist
Tweet and should be
shamed.

This chain of events demonstrates two things: first, that every act has a
social meaning, as Lessig describes, but second, that the very act of norm
enforcement has a distinct social meaning. While the social meaning of
some acts of shaming might be relatively clear—writing a lengthy blog post

145. McAdams, supra note 39, at 391–92.
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on how Sacco’s words are a shameful example of racism today—many are
not.
What is the social meaning of re-Tweeting a link to a lengthy blog post
about a racist girl? It could be re-Tweeted out of boredom. It could be reTweeted to shame. It could be re-Tweeted out of misogyny. It could be reTweeted as a piece of humor. It could be re-Tweeted sadistically. It is
impossible to determine the act’s precise meaning from the act alone.
This indeterminacy is true of the vast majority of online acts of social
norm enforcement—re-Tweeting a message; sharing a link; commenting
anonymously on a blog; liking something on Facebook—the acts
themselves are so small, discrete, and instant that they do not necessarily
have a clear social meaning. But, as Part III.B explains, this does not curb
their power.
B. Calibration
A central fear, expressed by almost all of the critics in the shame
debate, was the uncontrollable, and unpredictable nature of shaming. This
was stated in various ways, but perhaps best described by Whitman as the
loss of “measured punishment” or “transactional dignity.” 146 Whitman
predicted shaming would deprive offenders of such measured punishment
by subjecting them “to the public’s unpredictable response” and denying
them “the dignity that comes from our right to pay off a debt once and for
all and be done with our creditor.” 147 Thus, shame sanctions cede power to
punish from the state to the mob, and in doing so surrendered all rational
control over the effects.
With norms, however, the government does not have to cede the
power—the public already has it. And while the public was always armed
with its own tools and means of norm enforcement, the ready availability,
low-cost, and anonymity of modern technology and the Internet has
drastically changed whatever natural limits formerly conscribed shaming.
The Lynch Mob imagined by Whitman, Massaro, and Nussbaum would be
naturally constrained by geography, time, and expense. Before the Internet,
shaming took time, money, and physical presence: someone had to show up
to protest you, or see you walk by with a sign around your neck. People in
Eugene, Oregon, were not going to get in a car and drive to Jackson,
Mississippi to shame a drug dealer who dealt pot to elementary school kids.
And people in Jackson had to make a calculation of being seen by others in
their community if they decided to shame someone. In terms of time,
money, and personal reputation, shaming was expensive.
146. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1090.
147. Id.
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But the Internet, and access to it, has made shaming cheap, and as a
result, an Internet Lynch Mob has no such constraints. To Sacco, Cooley,
Smith, and Richards, the online reactions came in a tidal wave that felt like
unified public condemnation. To them it was the entire world saying they
were just bad; to the rest of the world, Sacco was just a millisecond of time
and one more favorited Tweet; Cooley was just one more forwarded e-mail;
and Smith was another “SMDH” 148 comment on a thread.
The same qualities about the Internet and technology that remove the
limits on norm enforcement also amplify shaming’s effects. Not only can
online shaming be a “tidal wave,” it can be a never-ending tidal wave.
Months after Sacco’s life was upended by her Tweet, her online presence is
still populated with public vitriol. Richards continues to fight a battle to
reclaim her online reputation. Almost everyone mentioned in these
examples lost their jobs or were forced to relocate because of online
shaming. The punishments are both extreme and endless and seem deeply
uncalibrated to the transgressions: a moment of mindless public racism; a
private, vaguely sexist comment; a blog post calling someone out for being
sexist. Endless public shaming and loss of livelihood seem like extreme
consequences for such offenses—and they happen even when no offense
has occurred, as Part III.C explains.
C. Accuracy
Ideally, when the state punishes, it has applied a process to determine
whether the person being punished has in fact committed the thing for
which they are being punished. No such measure exists in norm
enforcement and the Internet’s ability to amplify social norm enforcement
punishment is made even worse when there was no actual norm violation to
cause it.
Such was the case with Cooley, who was libeled as a murderer, childmolester, and debtor. Though Cooley was innocent of such actions, the
mere presence of these accusations of norm violation was enough to trigger
online, and then real-life, shaming.
In comparison, there was no false or even proffered norm violation to
explain the harassment Filipovic received. Her example effectively
delineates the taxonomic difference of how the same actions (excessive
online shaming) in one case should be considered online shaming or
defamation, while in another the same action should be considered cyber
harassment. 149

148. SMDH is an acronym typically used in social media contexts to stand for “Shaking My
Damn Head.”
149. The importance of this delineation is discussed infra Part IV.
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The stories of Cooley, Filipovic, and in some ways Richards also
highlight how the Internet gives factional groups a disproportionate amount
of power and visibility. Thus, the whims of a group of misogynistic
teenage hackers or one irrational individual with a vendetta and a dial-up
connection can be enforced at a much higher propensity and representation
than they might actually hold in society. These groups can exact shaming
punishments that tip-toe—nay, stomp—into realms of harassment and
bullying. Moreover, their power can be—and often, is—unchecked. This
is both because of anonymity but also because of a fear that any attempts to
speak out against these groups will only turn their retributive gaze on you––
as Filipovic found out in her requests to Auto Admit.
As demonstrated above, modern technology and the Internet have
altered social norm enforcement and removed the natural limits, which once
made shaming a relatively viable solution to norm violations. Instead, in
this new era, shaming is an indeterminate, inaccurate, and uncalibrated form
of punishment. Twenty years after legal scholars debated using shame as a
tool of the state, the conversation has shifted to whether and how the state
can best curb shaming. The next Part will look at how realizations from the
shame debate, successful uses of online norm enforcement, and private
remedies to inform the debate around state intervention.
IV. THE FUTURE OF ONLINE SHAME
While this Article has thus far focused on when online shaming goes
wrong, there are some examples of when shaming goes right. 150 One such
example is the online meme known as “manspreading.” The origins of the
“manspreading” campaign are unclear. At least one blog, “Your Balls Are
Not That Big,” has intermittent posts starting in September 2011. 151
Another Tumblr, “Men Taking Up Too Much Space on the Train,” has
archives starting in May 2013 152 and countless Tweets featuring pictures of
offenders hashtagged with “#manspreading” before The New York Times
“officially” recognized the trend in December 2014. 153 But like many
campaigns that take hold via social media, the exact naissance is a bit of a
150. For further discussion around the potential benefits of shaming see JENNIFER JACQUET,
IS SHAME NECESSARY? (2015). See also DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2006)
(arguing that some shaming can be positive when it gives voice to the generally-voiceless, as seen
in consumer service forums or street harassment campaigns like Hollaback).
BALLS
ARE
NOT
THAT
BIG:
ARCHIVE,
151. YOUR
http://yourballsarenotthatbig.tumblr.com/archive/2011/9 (last visited July 30, 2015).
152. MEN TAKING UP TOO MUCH SPACE ON THE TRAIN: ARCHIVE,
http://mentakingup2muchspaceonthetrain.tumblr.com/archive (last visited July 30, 2015).
153. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, A Scourge is Spreading. M.T.A.’s Cure? Dude, Close Your Legs,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/MTA-targetsmanspreading-on-new-york-city-subways.html?_r=0.
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mystery—even though the movement’s message is surely not: men, it is not
okay to sit with your legs wide open on public transit and take up more than
your share of the train.
Though the name and early adoption of the meme has feminist
overtones—creating awareness of how men often feel entitled to take up
more public space than women—the complaint is also about a larger misuse
or abuse of the commons. Using the hashtag “#manspreading,” public
transportation riders across the world can draw attention to this violation. A
typical post contains a picture, often only from the shoulders down, of a
man guilty of such a violation combined with subject-relevant hashtags and
occasional editorial comment.154 Some blogs aggregate or curate such
pictures posted on Twitter or Instagram; others recirculate pictures in a
humorous way, adding photo-shopped images in between legs, and comical
captions. 155
As a meme, manspreading was inherently viral and decentralized, but
it was also powerful. In 2015, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, which
oversees New York City’s subway system, released public service ads
encouraging men to be more courteous with public space: 156

The message, posted on subway cars and on subway platforms, was
part of a larger “courtesy counts” campaign that was put forth by the MTA,
which included other requests such as letting others off the train before

154. See e.g., Oliver Bjrklund (@OliverBjrklund), TWITTER (July 17, 2015, 4:18 PM),
https://twitter.com/OliverBjrklund/status/622138378247643136;
Parantha
Alley
(@ParanthaAlley),
TWITTER
(June
14,
2015,
9:57
PM),
https://twitter.com/ParanthaAlley/status/610264948581773313; Siân de Freyssinet (@pinkyde),
TWITTER (Apr. 21, 2015, 11:24 AM), https://twitter.com/pinkyde/status/590536528478281728.
155. SAVING ROOM FOR CATS, http://savingroomforcats.tumblr.com/ (last visited July 30,
2015); ONE BRO TWO SEATS, http://onebrotwoseats.tumblr.com/ (last visited July 30, 2015).
COURTESY
COUNTS,
156. MTA:
http://web.mta.info/nyct/service/CourtesyCounts.htm#DUDESTOPTHESPREAD (last visited
July 30, 2015).
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getting on; giving a seat to the disabled, elderly, or pregnant; and not using
the subway pole for dancing.
The manspreading meme is a great example of how online shaming
can be used effectively, but this could be in part because it differs
dramatically from the instances above in that it is not about shaming the
norm violator, but instead, the violation. This addresses one of Nussbaum’s
main concerns with shaming: that the purpose of most online shaming is to
isolate a norm violator by burdening them with a degraded identity. 157
Focusing the shame on the act eliminates the amplification of uncalibrated
punishment, the conflation of the social meaning of the act with the
violator, and minimizes the necessity of accuracy.
But the success of manspreading is certainly the exception. As shown
above, online shaming can be, and often is, inaccurate, overdetermined, and
uncalibrated. The following are current and potential solutions to these
issues with online shaming.
A. Normative Conscriptions on Shaming
Just as shame is used to enforce norm violations, sometimes certain
norm enforcement actions will violate norms themselves, and in turn be
shamed. Using the structure from earlier, the following demonstrates how
Richards’s and Smith’s story took just such a circular path:
Here is a norm:
And here is an act:

157. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 172–221.

Sexism is bad.
Private sexist comment at a public
event.
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And here is a chain of consequences stemming from the social
meaning of that act:
Male Commenter has violated norms
against sexism.

Blogger writes post denouncing
Commenter as sexist for private
comments, posting Commenter’s
picture and calling for his firing.

I should be careful not to
violate social norms against
sexism or I could be shamed
like Male Commenter.

Blogger and post violates
other norms favoring
privacy.

Third-party blog post on news media
site and social media exposure
condemning Blogger for exposing
Commenter.

I should be careful that a
norm violation has
occurred before I act to
enforce it.

I better not bully
people online or I
could be shamed
like Blogger.

Though Richards first capitalized on what she saw as a clear norm
violation to shame the offender, but the legitimacy of the underlying norm
violation (the statements were made privately, and perhaps not sexist at all)
coupled with the amplitude and gravity of the shaming effects
(Commentator lost job), triggered new norm violations and set into motion
counter-norm enforcement (shaming). The result is a type of feedback loop
to enforce norms even when the norm enforcement might be in conflict
with the norm that was violated, even though shaming Richards might be a
convoluted, somewhat ironic punishment for her supposed wrongful
shaming of Smith. In this way, one might argue, norms are capable of
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policing themselves, changing and issuing recursive punishments and
updates in an ever-changing dynamic of enforcement and evolution.
But this would be a drastic oversimplification. Counter-norm
enforcement does little to address or amend the underlying problems with
online shaming, and in fact only builds on them. In Richards’s case, for
example, the social meaning of her online shaming might be that she
violated a norm against privacy or it could simply be cyber harassment by a
factional group. Moreover, shaming Richards does nothing to curtail or end
the online shaming of Smith, and perhaps only adds to the indeterminacy of
each party’s shaming.
Thus, it is easy to see how trusting counter-norm enforcement to
regulate norms entirely could easily lead to a scorched-earth scenario and a
worsening of the online shame culture.
B. Legal Conscriptions on Shaming
Unlike with social norm enforcement, when the state punishes, it gives
specific social meaning to the punishment, calibrates that punishment, and
provides a process to attempt to ensure that the correct person and crime is
being punished. These are all qualities that are missing from online
shaming, so it might seem natural to look to the government for solutions,
but that remedy is not without its own drawbacks. Part I.V.B.1 examines
existing legal remedies and proposed legislation to curb online shaming,
cyber harassment, and cyber bullying.
1. Defamation, Libel and Emotional Distress
It is worth immediately noting that one kind of legal remedy is already
a relatively effective protection against unhinged shaming: defamation law.
Cooley’s story is a perfect example of this: though wrongfully shamed and
forced to leave his small town, his eventual legal victory exposed his
attacker and the lies on which his shame was built, and allowed him to
return to his community, almost as if nothing had happened.
But a number of practical concerns limit the utility of defamation law
as a way to curb shaming. Foremost, to sue for defamation, the statements
made against the potential plaintiff must be false.158 In Cooley’s case, his
shaming was based entirely on lies. This was a necessary element to him
using libel as a remedy against his shaming. But had it not been—and until
it was publicly exposed as such by a trial—Cooley’s shaming was very
similar to that seen by Sacco and Richards. Had the Topix postings against
Cooley been anything other than baseless falsifications, if they had even
158. Truth is always a defense to defamation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A
(1969).
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potentially contained elements of truth, Cooley’s suit might not have been
so successful. Moreover, as was the case with Sacco and Richards, it is
often the offenders’ true, self-publicized actions or words that lead to the
shaming, making them ineligible for any kind of defamation relief.159
Sacco, Richards and Filipovic 160 might have tort claims for intentional
or reckless infliction of emotional distress with “extreme and outrageous
conduct.” 161 Especially for Filipovic, the personal attacks, rape threats, and
communication with her would potentially qualify as extreme and
outrageous conduct because “it falls outside the norms of decency.”162
But litigation is a costly and timely remedy. Years can—and often
do—pass before a case is settled or tried. In the meantime, the shaming can
continue, or even accelerate. In Cooley’s case, he left Blairsville for the
years during which he sought to uncover his accuser and sue for
defamation. Though his jury verdict restored his reputation, the defendant
was judgment-proof, so Cooley will never be compensated for the time he
lost to his online shaming. This, as well as issues with anonymous users,
are often a problem with pursuing judgments against online harassers.163
2.

Right to Be Forgotten or Information Privacy Speech
Restrictions

A libel judgment might be a type of remedy for the loss of procedural
justice inflicted on Cooley, but what recourse would Sacco and Richards
have for any kind of procedure or “measured punishment”?
One solution seems to be legal recognition of a new right—arguably a
new norm—the “right to be forgotten.” 164 The right to be forgotten
“reflects the claim of an individual to have certain data deleted so that third
persons can no longer trace them.” 165 Though debated globally since the
early 2000s, the right to be forgotten was only recognized as an established

159. The analysis for relief would also be different if the target of shaming happened to be a
public figure. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1969).
160. For cases like Filipovic or Richards where posters continuously updated online threads
threatening rape and murder, criminal harassment charges might seem an obvious solution. But
because much of their harassment was posted online and not directed to them specifically, the
abuse falls outside most states’ harassment laws. CITRON, supra note 29, at 143.
161. CITRON, supra note 29, at 121.
162. Id. at 122 (citing Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness and the Open
Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011) and CITRON, supra note 29, at 133–34).
163. CITRON, supra note 29, at 122.
164. This, in some ways, might approach the “dignity” arguments espoused by Nussbaum and
Massaro.
165. Rolf H. Weber, The Right to Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?, 2 JIPITEC
121
(2011),
http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-2011/3084/jipitec%202%20-%20a%20%20weber.pdf.
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legal precedent in May 2014 by the European Court of Justice. 166 Since
then, the scope of its enforcement has been widely debated, with major
companies like Google resisting global application.167 Though it might
seem that the right to be forgotten is a natural solution to the fears created
by excessive and unchecked public shaming, the right to be forgotten runs
up against another highly-valued norm and legal protection: free speech.
Thus, on the one hand, we increasingly value our privacy rights on the
Internet, and on the other, the fear that protecting those rights could lead to
censorship. 168
Professor Eugene Volokh has been at the fore of this debate. He
argues that in recognizing a right to be forgotten—or a “right to control
your communication of personally identifiable information about me”—we
face the difficult problem of creating a “right to have the government stop
you from speaking about me.” 169 Volokh spells out the future of the
possible incantations of this right against American First Amendment law
and associated free speech jurisprudence, ultimately concluding that any
restrictions on speech around personal information would be “constitutional
under current doctrine only if they are imposed by contract, express or
implied.” 170 These exceptions would have to be drawn incredibly narrowly,
in order to avoid “unintended consequences” to the right to free speech.171
But the appeal of the right to be forgotten remains intuitive and
undeniable, arguably because we have now seen the power of unchecked
public shaming. 172 Information speech restrictions like the right to be
forgotten are appealing because they speak to a new collective danger
exemplified by Sacco and Richards: in going about your daily life, your
actions might suddenly be held under a microscope, or broadcast to the
world, and replayed on infinite loop. The battle between protection from
this fear and loss of personal liberty and privacy is of course a familiar, and
complicated, legal battle.

166. David Streitfeld, European Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/technology/google-should-erase-web-links-tosome-personal-data-europes-highest-court-says.html.
167. Alistair Barr & Sam Schechner, Google Advisory Group Recommends Limiting ‘Right to
Be Forgotten’ to EU, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-advisorygroup-says-limit-right-to-be-forgotten-to-eu-1423206470.
168. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050–
51 (2000).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1122.
171. Id. at 1123.
172. Id. at 1100 (acknowledging that information privacy speech descriptions were “viscerally
appealing”).
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C. Purely Private Action
Some of the private efforts of shamed individuals to reclaim their
reputation and end their shaming demonstrate the power of private action to
conscript shaming or cyber harassment.
The story of Filipovic is central here, as she was able to use the same
qualities of the Internet that allowed strangers to harass her to recover her
online presence. Of course, Filipovic had the advantage of already being a
“public figure” online and thus being able to rally a faction of supporters to
aid her, but businesses have sprung up to manufacture the same result.
Reputation.com is one of the foremost online reputation management
companies. “We believe individuals and businesses have the right to
control how they look online,” states the Reputation.com’s “About Us”
page. Their business model is a paid-for service that can be available to any
business or public or private individual. 173 It works in a similar, but more
sophisticated way to Filipovic’s approach: assailing search algorithms with
new webpages, pictures, and text, in a “choreographed” way, to maximize
the staying power of the new reputational information.174
Issuing apologies are also moderately effective in curbing shaming. In
Smith’s case, his apology for his sexist statement curtailed some of the
vitriol, though it had the side effect of making Richards a new target for
shame. But in the recent example of Walter Palmer, the Midwestern dentist
who sparked global outrage after killing Cecil the Lion, an apology letter
did very little to assuage the worldwide torrent of shame. 175
Such methods of reclaiming online presence are arguably effective, but
they are not without limits. 176 Like litigation, such solutions are costly and
timely, and they are also limited to the Internet—they can do little to
nothing to repair real-world damage that happens as a result of online
shaming.
D. Refreshing and Re-Shaming the Debate
Far from using shame as a governmental tool, there is now a growing
sense that online shaming is something we want to control; but any
regulation must be balanced against competing normative and legal values
like free speech. As Danielle Citron writes in Hate Crimes in Cyberspace,
173. REPUTATION.COM: ABOUT US, http://www.reputation.com/about-us (last visited July 30,
2015).
174. RONSON, supra note 3, at 268.
175. Matt DeLong, Read the Full Statement from Walter Palmer on Killing of Cecil the Lion,
STAR TRIBUNE (July 29, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/read-the-full-statement-from-walterpalmer/318947551/.
176. RONSON, supra note 3, at 263–74 (chronicling the use of Reputation.com by shaming
victim Lindsey Stone, and demonstrating its apparent success).

2016]

RE-SHAMING THE DEBATE

1063

“[a] legal agenda against cyber-harassment . . . can balance civil rights and
civil liberties for the good of each.” 177 This is also true of legal reform
around online shaming. Though there are not currently any absolute
solutions to curtailing online shaming, we can learn much by considering
online shaming within the framework of social norms and the shame
debate, and the lessons of those who have been shamed.
1. New Taxonomies: Distinctions Between Online Shaming, Cyber
Harassment, and Cyber Bullying
Though they are often conflated, online shaming, cyber bullying and
cyber harassment are very different things. This Article began with a
theoretical definition of shaming that appended “real or perceived norm
violation” to the definition of harassment. As the examples in Part II supra
show, this is an important distinction. Unlike the other people described,
Filipovic and countless others like her violated no norms and were accused
of violating no norms. The online shame, hate, and vitriol that surrounded
them, destroyed their online presence, and upended their real lives was
arbitrary, capricious, and committed by small factions of online users.
Citron’s calls for reform to criminal stalking and harassment laws, deanonymization of users and removal of Communications Decency Act
Section 230 liability for the “worst offenders” of Internet sites, are all
critical and measured proposals to solve the serious issues of cyber
harassment and cyber bullying.
But where does Adria Richards fit in that taxonomy? It can certainly
be argued that Richards violated a norm, but it could just as easily be
argued that misogynist Internet factions targeted her like they targeted
Filipovic. Richards is a victim of online shaming and cyber harassment.
Her example demonstrates how easily and quickly events and normative
enforcement can change on the Internet, and how rapidly it can deteriorate.
One thing is clear: Richards’s violation of a norm does not justify her
cyber harassment. Nor does it justify her online shaming. The problems
that arise in online shaming—inaccuracy, indeterminate meaning, and lack
of calibration—are why it is an ineffective and intolerable punishment.
2. Shaming Acts, Not People
As Nussbaum argued in the shame debate, the danger of shaming is in
ostracizing the norm-violator from society by marking them with a
degraded identity (in the case of online shaming, a horrible Google history).
But if you attach that stigma to an act, you can accomplish the same

177. CITRON, supra note 29, at 193.
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effect—removing norm violation—without the problems caused by online
shaming and the danger of sliding into the realm of cyber harassment.
Thus, manspreading was a successful use of online shaming because it
targeted the act of norm violation rather than a specific person. This
decoupling of norm violator from norm violation should be continued and
encouraged in online shaming and in future regulation that might address
online shaming.
3. Best Practices for Action
A successful defamation suit meant Cooley could return to his life as if
“nothing had happened.” Reverse Google bombing and online reputation
management have the power to finally end the shame meted out by the
Internet’s infinite memory. These solutions work because they speak to the
problems we have with public shaming. A defamation judgment is a
powerful solution to shaming because it provides accuracy. It also uses the
government’s power as a loudspeaker and trusted arbiter to counter the
amplifying effects of the Internet. Online reputation management is
effective because it can change what is being discussed and calibrate the
punishment of online shaming.
Though these are seemingly disparate resolutions both in substance
and procedure they are alike in a key way: neither of them involve
censoring the shaming, but rather adding to the public action and thus
changing and quelling its meaning. “The Internet is forever,” said Russell
Stookey, the attorney for Cooley, “that’s what I tell all of my clients, that’s
what I tell all of my children.” 178
So what would implementation of such a solution look like? The
possibilities are wide-ranging. At the most broad: a governmental watchdog agency to oversee and administratively adjudicate Internet “dignitary”
harms and issuing financial sanctions, or even simply letters of judgment
that state an offender’s contrition and acknowledging the extent of their
shame. This would harness both the government’s promise of accuracy and
its power of publicity. 179 Such letters could be posted online by the
shaming victims, or alternatively, a government-mandated notification
could appear at the top of search results for a shamed person’s name,
linking to the agency’s letter and a statement of apology to the victim.
Alternatively, Internet Service Providers and major Internet companies like
Google, Yahoo, and Twitter could implement their own internal agency to
review online shaming and cyber harassment claims, though this is perhaps

178. Telephone Interview, supra note 123.
179. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 334 (1991).
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even more unlikely than a government watchdog group given the liability
this would expose them to under current law. 180 Regardless, the additive
nature of this solution makes it even more viable, as it addresses many of
the concerns around the information privacy speech debate and the right to
be forgotten. Those solutions favor government-facilitated takedown or
removal of speech that is deemed offensive, an obvious anathema to free
speech rights. Creating a process and system for publication would involve
no level of censorship, but rather, an opportunity to change and inform the
social meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
Online shame is problematic in large part because it is an inaccurate,
indeterminate, and uncalibrated form of punishment. In creating a
regulatory solution to online shaming, the framework of social norms,
lessons of the shame debate, and viability of past remedies should be
considered.

180. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
This case was seminal—though fleetingly—in that it held Prodigy Servers to be a publisher, and
therefore liable for defamation, because it exercised editorial control over its published content.
This precedent was undone by the Communications Decency Act which granted online service
providers broad immunity “to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).

